



# Neurodynamical Articulation: Decoupling Intelligence from the Experiencing Self

*QuEST // April 28, 2023*

**Joseph D. Monaco, SelfMotion Labs & National Institutes of Health**

# Intelligence vs. conscious experience

Minded vs. unminded competence,  
calculative rationality, and computation



- The BIG questions...
  - What is intelligence and what is it for?
  - What is consciousness and what is it for?



# Neurodynamical computing

## A dynamical control framework for biological intelligence

1. Briefly review disciplinary approaches to formalizing biological intelligence
  - Highlight persistent gaps in concepts, theories, and hypotheses
2. Motivate a perceptual control framework for resolving external observer bias
  - Informational implications for cognitive computing with neural dynamics
3. Synthesize structure and temporal properties of mammalian hippocampal-cortical networks
  - Oscillations, dynamical articulation, and agency





# Three paths...

**Framing an integrative (computational) neuroscience of intelligence**

- Cybernetics →  
Cognitive Science
- GOFAI →  
“Third Wave” AI learning and reasoning
- Behaviorist Psychology →  
Mainstream neuroscience
- Physics of neural systems →  
Computational neuroscience





500x500  $\mu\text{m}$  f.o.v. over mouse CA1 of synapsin-driven GCaMP6f during training in an olfactory working-memory task.


*Video Credit: J. Taxidis*



# External observer bias

## Inverting the input-output paradigm


1. Computational metaphors for the brain have entrenched the behaviorist bias that externally observable output is the endpoint of brain function
2. Neuroscience and AI have both embraced this bias, with either explicit or implicit input and output layers for computations
3. Implied control paradigm is one of building forward (predictive) models












 Position

Spike legend

- Cell 1
- Cell 2
- Cell 3
- Cell 4
- Cell 5
- Cell 6
- Cell 7
- Cell 8
- Cell 9
- Cell 10

Time: 0.02s    Speed: 1x    Spikes: 0    1 m 

**Not Actual Speed**

# Embodied cognition


## Progressive articulation vs. forward models

Embodiment-first theories invert our view of cognition as integrating isolated channels of sensory information into unified internal models, to one of articulating dynamical boundaries within existing global states that already reflect an organism's cumulative experience in its world (*umwelt*).



# Dynamical systems view of cognition


Temporal unfolding and the locus of agency



Watts' steam governor:  
agent or tool?

# Dynamical systems view of cognition

Temporal unfolding and the locus of agency



# Reorganizing the control flow

Perceptual control internalizes input, output, and goals

- Goal-setting autonomy recognizes the agency inherent in embodied living systems
  - Animals have goals and those goals govern their behavior
- Environmental control is established through internal perceptual control of corresponding sensory input

# Reorganizing the control flow

Perceptual control internalizes input, output, and goals




FIG. 2.1 Diagram of a negative feedback control system.<sup>21</sup>





FIG. 2.2 PCT model of a control system; control theory for psychologists.

# Reorganizing the control flow

Perceptual control internalizes input, output, and goals



**Figure 3.3**

Highly simplified sequence of feedback control systems comprising a lizard's foraging for an ant efficiently and flexibly. *G* = goal; *A* = action; *P* = perception (to see if actual situation matches goal situation). Each box actually represents a hierarchy of submechanisms (e.g., moving limbs to locomote, opening mouth to eat, etc.).

# Reorganizing the control flow

## Perceptual control internalizes input, output, and goals

- Behavior is no longer the *output* of the neural system
  - Outputs ( $Y_0$ ) are cascading internal reference signals
  - The lowest control levels form the self–nonself boundary that interacts with the environment
- Internal perceptions of controlled environmental variables are controlled, not behavior





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


# Active inference

## The generative role of behavior

- Optimal (Bayesian) inference in feedback-driven generative models require *active inference*: actions that maximize model evidence by balancing internal active-state (self) entropy with external sensory-state (nonself) entropy.
- *Agents learn massively distributed internal feedback models by adaptively balancing information streams arising at the self–nonself boundary.*






5x Speed

*Video Credit: G. Rao*



# Example



63.4 s

# Example


Location of scan firing



80.4 s

# Active inference


## Cognitive map-building driven by autonomous head-scan sampling



# Integrative framework for neurodynamical cognition

## (1) Network structure:

Sparse, distributed hierarchies are non-strict




## (2) Temporal dynamics:

## (3) Agentic interaction:

# Integrative framework for neurodynamical cognition

Readers phase-shift to select inputs and establish communication channels

## (1) Network structure:





## (2) Temporal dynamics:

- Example: Nested oscillations with phase-amplitude coupling between levels of the pseudohierarchy



## (3) Agentic interaction:

# Integrative framework for neurodynamical cognition

## (1) Network structure:



## (2) Temporal dynamics:



## (3) Agentic interaction:

- Example: Attentive head-scanning behavior (Monaco et al., 2014)



# Papers

## Neurodynamical principles for embodied intelligence




**Monaco JD** and Hwang GM. (2022). Neurodynamical computing at the information boundaries of intelligent systems. *Cognitive Computation*.  
doi: [10.1007/s12559-022-10081-9](https://doi.org/10.1007/s12559-022-10081-9)

**Monaco JD**, Rajan K, and Hwang GM. (2021). A brain basis of dynamical intelligence for AI and computational neuroscience. *ArXiv Preprint*.  
arxiv:2105.07284

## Head scanning modifies cognitive maps

**Monaco JD**, Rao G, Roth ED, and Knierim JJ. (2014). Attentive scanning behavior drives one-trial potentiation of hippocampal place fields. *Nature Neuroscience*, 17(5), 725–731. doi: [10.1038/nn.3687](https://doi.org/10.1038/nn.3687)


→ <https://jdmonaco.com/pubs>




# Temporal and Population Dynamics

## Key Building Blocks


- **Local oscillations and neuronal synchrony**
  - Temporal coding with oscillatory phase
  - O'Keefe & Recce (1993) — Theta-phase precession of hippocampal place-field firing
- **Emergent self-organizing states arising from recurrence and feedback in structured networks**
  - Hopfield networks (1982) — Pattern completion supports content-addressable memory with (limited) generalization
  - **Memory retrieval as a state-space trajectory that probes basins of attraction**



Hafting et al. (2008)



Knierim & Zhang (2012)




Hedrick & Zhang (2016)

# Temporal and Population Dynamics

## Key Building Blocks


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Cell assemblies, synaptic traces, and reentrant loops




# Continual rebuilding of world models

## Theta-flickering of hippocampal maps



**Figure 3a.1**  
Place cell B fires at different times relative to the background theta-wave as the rat moves from locations A through C. Reprinted from Buckner (2010) with permission.



# You have to care to be a “you”, and you have to feel to care

Affective-interoceptive origin of  
consciousness

“We would not only need a model of the brain functioning underlying coupled coping such as Freeman’s, but we would also need—and here’s the rub—a model of our particular way of being embedded and embodied such that what we experience is significant for us in the particular way that it is.”

Dreyfus. (2007). *Why Heideggerian AI failed...*



# Intelligence vs. conscious experience

Interoceptor theory of consciousness and narrative dynamics across the lifespan

- The BIG questions...
  - What is intelligence and what is it for?
  - What is consciousness and what is it for?
- These are *real* questions, but are they *hard*?



# Theories of consciousness

There are many...

Table 1 | A selection of theories of consciousness














Theory	Primary claim	Key refs
Higher-order theory (HOT)	Consciousness depends on meta-representations of lower-order mental states	31,46
Self-organizing meta-representational theory	Consciousness is the brain's (meta-representational) theory about itself	34,140
Attended intermediate representation theory	Consciousness depends on the attentional amplification of intermediate-level representations	141,142
Global workspace theories (GWTs)	Consciousness depends on ignition and broadcast within a neuronal global workspace where fronto-parietal cortical regions play a central, hub-like role	47–49
Integrated information theory (IIT)	Consciousness is identical to the cause–effect structure of a physical substrate that specifies a maximum of irreducible integrated information	57,59,60
Information closure theory	Consciousness depends on non-trivial information closure with respect to an environment at particular coarse-grained scales	143
Dynamic core theory	Consciousness depends on a functional cluster of neural activity combining high levels of dynamical integration and differentiation	144
Neural Darwinism	Consciousness depends on re-entrant interactions reflecting a history of value-dependent learning events shaped by selectionist principles	145,146
Local recurrency	Consciousness depends on local recurrent or re-entrant cortical processing and promotes learning	65,71
Predictive processing	Perception depends on predictive inference of the causes of sensory signals; provides a framework for systematically mapping neural mechanisms to aspects of consciousness	67,73,79
Neuro-representationalism	Consciousness depends on multilevel neurally encoded predictive representations	84
Active inference	Although views vary, in one version consciousness depends on temporally and counterfactually deep inference about self-generated actions	76; see also <sup>91</sup>
Beast machine theory	Consciousness is grounded in allostatic control-oriented predictive inference	13,75,77; see also <sup>90</sup>
Neural subjective frame	Consciousness depends on neural maps of the bodily state providing a first-person perspective	24
Self comes to mind theory	Consciousness depends on interactions between homeostatic routines and multilevel interoceptive maps, with affect and feeling at the core	23,147
Attention schema theory	Consciousness depends on a neurally encoded model of the control of attention	148

Multiple drafts model	Consciousness depends on multiple (potentially inconsistent) representations rather than a single, unified representation that is available to a central system	149
Sensorimotor theory	Consciousness depends on mastery of the laws governing sensorimotor contingencies	88
Unlimited associative learning	Consciousness depends on a form of learning which enables an organism to link motivational value with stimuli or actions that are novel, compound and non-reflex inducing	150
Dendritic integration theory	Consciousness depends on integration of top-down and bottom-up signalling at a cellular level	151
Electromagnetic field theory	Consciousness is identical to physically integrated, and causally active, information encoded in the brain's global electromagnetic field	152
Orchestrated objective reduction	Consciousness depends on quantum computations within microtubules inside neurons	18

Our selection of theories includes those that are either neurobiological in nature or potentially expressible in neurobiological terms.

# Theories of consciousness

There are many...






# Images, maps, and conscious content

## Mutually aligned and registered maps

- An organism manages three sensoriums
  - Exteroception
  - Proprioception
  - Interoception
- All peripheral sensory activations construct neural patterns that pass through cortical and subcortical maps that impose a shared regimented order and structure
  - Neural patterns → mental “images”
  - Fingerprint of “ownership” and origin of self-perspective



# The cortical fallacy

Do we need it?

- Hydroanencephalic children




Figure 4 Brain scan of a three-year-old-girl born without a cerebral cortex. The large dark region inside the skull indicates missing tissue.



Figure 5 Reaction of a hydranencephalic girl to her baby brother being placed in her lap.

# Non-explicit vs. explicit intelligence

## Knowledge requires conscious inspection


- All organisms sense and respond
  - Sensing is necessary for constructing a mind
    - A mind is necessary to support a conscious state
      - Disrupt sensing (e.g., anaesthesia) → conscious states evaporate
- Unminded intelligence is far more ancient than minded
  - Reflex, habit, automaticity
  - Hidden/obscured adaptations at the molecular level and lower



# Then what is sufficient for conscious states?

## Mental images must be grounded in (primordial) feeling


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# Elaborate affective-emotive construction

## Direct visceral access to neural systems


- The visceral and peripheral milieu of bodies has direct access to peripheral ascending nerves
- Unmyelinated, unlike exteroceptive and proprioceptive systems
- Less precision, but direct and deeply integrated access




# Elaborate affective-emotive construction

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
- Evolutionarily ancient system
  - Early fish (right) and amphibians (below)



Octavolateralis Placodes





Lateral Line Nerves




# Elaborate affective-emotive construction

## Direct visceral access to neural systems


- Stem tetrapods and stem mammals




**Mammaliaform**  
(*Morganucodon*)



**Cynodont** (*Thrinaxodon*)




**Therapsid** (*Lycaenops*)



# Elaborate affective-emotive construction

## Direct visceral access to neural systems

- Interoceptive signals converge onto a small set of highly conserved brainstem nuclei
  - Parabrachial nucleus
  - Periaqueductal gray (PAG)
  - Nucleus of the tractus solitarius







# Elaborate affective-emotive construction

## Direct visceral access to neural systems

- Interoceptive signals converge onto a small set of highly conserved brainstem nuclei



Ddc - teleost Dd & Dc  
 dp - dorsal pallium  
 "dp" - "dorsal pallium"  
 lp - lateral pallium  
 lt - lateral torus  
 mp - medial pallium  
 ob - olfactory bulb  
 poa - preoptic area  
 pt - post. tuberculum  
 sep - septum  
 str - striatum  
 th - thalamus  
 vp - ventral pallium





# Conserved imageretic mapping cortices

Exteroceptive (body-in-world) and proprioceptive (brain-in-body) reference frames

- The “image-making” cortices are also highly conserved within mammalia, reflecting ~200 million years of selection

## Mammals




# Conserved imagetic mapping cortices

Exteroceptive (body-in-world) and proprioceptive (brain-in-body) reference frames


- Massive increase in primate and human prefrontal volumes does not alter conserved brain-region allometry

## Mammals




## Rodent (*Rattus*)


Lateral view




Medial view




## Strepsirhine (*Galago*)




Motor/premotor  
Granular prefrontal, moderately myelinated



## Old World Monkey (*Macaca*)





Granular prefrontal, lightly myelinated



rostral ←  
↑ dorsal

# The periaqueductal gray (PAG)

Key affective-emotive relay for modulating pain, drives, neuromodulators



# Ok, so how do we make a conscious robot?

**It must feel pain, and learn to cope with it.**

There would have been a time for such a word  
Tomorrow, and tomorrow, and tomorrow,  
Creeps in this petty pace from day to day  
To the last syllable of recorded time,  
And all our yesterdays have lighted fools  
The way to dusty death. Out, out, brief candle!  
Life's but a walking shadow, a poor player  
That struts and frets his hour upon the stage  
And then is heard no more: it is a tale  
Told by an idiot, full of sound and fury,  
Signifying nothing.



Patrick Stewart as Macbeth

